This paper documents that out-migration promotes the diffusion of innovation from the country of destination to the country of origin of migrants. Between 1870 and 1940, nearly four million British immigrants settled in the United States. We construct a novel individual-level dataset linking British immigrants in the US to the UK census, and we digitize the universe of UK patents from 1853 to 1899. Using a triple-differences design, we show that migration ties contribute to technology diffusion from the destination to the origin country. The text analysis of patents reveals that emigration promotes technology transfer and fosters the production of high-impact innovation. Return migration is an important driver of this "return innovation" effect. However, the interactions between emigrants and their origin communities--families and neighbors--promote technology diffusion even in the absence of migrants' physical return.

Between 1920 and 1921, Italian emigration to the United States dropped by 85% after the Emergency Quota Act was passed by Congress, a severely restrictive immigration law. Using newly digitized data from Italian historical censuses in a difference-in-differences setting, we leverage variation in exposure across Italian districts to this large restriction on human mobility. More exposed districts display a sizable population increase. Moreover, the policy substantially hampered the adoption of labor-saving technology. Consistently with directed technology adoption theory, manufacturing employment markedly increased, and evidence suggests that "missing migrants" whose migration was inhibited by the Act drove this result.

How do societies respond to adversity? After a negative shock, separate strands of research document either an increase in religiosity or a boost in scientific progress. In this paper, we show that both reactions can occur at the same time, driven by different individuals within society. The setting of our study is the 1918--1919 influenza pandemic in the United States. To measure religiosity, we construct a novel indicator based on the naming patterns of newborns. We measure scientific progress through the share of people in STEM occupations and the universe of granted patents. Exploiting plausibly exogenous county-level variation in exposure to the pandemic, we provide evidence that more affected counties become both more religious and more scientific. Within counties, we uncover heterogeneous responses: individuals from more religious backgrounds further embrace religion, while those from less religious backgrounds become more likely to choose a scientific occupation. Facing adversity widens the distance in religiosity between science-oriented individuals and the rest of the population and increases the polarization of religious beliefs.

This paper studies the distinctive pricing dynamics of durable goods and analyzes their implications for the conduct of monetary policy in a menu-cost economy. Using price microdata, I document the following new facts: (i) the dispersion of price changes in durables is higher than in nondurables; (ii) the frequency of price adjustment is countercyclical, however durable prices get relatively rigid in recessions; (iii) the dispersion of price changes is countercyclical for durables, and procyclical for nondurables. I develop a menu-cost model embedding durable consumption and calibrate it to match new and consolidated empirical evidence. I use the model to challenge the prevailing view holding that durable goods dampen the real effectiveness of monetary policy. I find that even though durable goods prices are relatively flexible, the model generates substantial monetary non-neutrality. Moreover, this paper puts forward a new channel whereby durable consumption can amplify the real effects of monetary policy. This result is driven by heterogeneous demand pass-through of aggregate shocks across sectors. Higher durable consumption enhances the sensitivity of nondurable output to interest rate shocks thus amplifying monetary non-neutrality.

Can racial discrimination harm innovation? We study this question using data on US inventors linked to population censuses in 1895-1925. Our novel identification strategy leverages plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of lynchings and the name of the victims. We find an immediate and persistent decrease in patents granted to inventors who share their names with the victims of lynchings, but only when victims are Black. We hypothesize that lynchings accentuate the racial content of the victim's name to patent examiners, who cannot observe the inventors' race from patent applications. We interpret these findings as evidence of discrimination by patent examiners and provide results against alternative mechanisms.

Natural disasters catalyze innovative activity. This paper asks whether industrial policy can direct this activity to generate innovation that mitigates their adverse consequences. We draw on two historical episodes: the great fires in Chicago (1871) and Boston (1872). In Chicago, the municipal authority forbade wooden constructions after the fire, while no such policy was enacted in Boston. We find that innovation, employment, and output of construction firms increased in both cities. In Chicago, however, these effects are concentrated in firms that operate in non-wood construction. In Boston, instead, they are diluted across all construction firms. In Chicago, we estimate positive spillover effects in sectors that were technically closer to non-wood construction, such as metallurgy and chemistry, while no such effect is present in Boston.

This paper examines the impact of sewing machines on female labor force participation, fertility, and marriage market outcomes. Historians regard sewing machines as a significant technical breakthrough affecting women's role at work and at home. We leverage industry-level exposure to sewing machines and novel data on sewing machine retailers in the United States. In a difference-in-differences design, we show that the diffusion of sewing machines between 1860 and 1880 substantially increased female labor force participation while fertility and marriages decreased. The effects of the sewing machines are vastly heterogeneous across income groups. Our results suggest that poor women drive the bulk of the increase in female labor force participation and fertility decline. Wealthy women, on the other hand, respond to the establishment of sewing machine retailers. This suggests that the impact of sewing machines as household appliances is concentrated at the top of the income distribution. Finally, we quantify large intergenerational spillovers of women's exposure to sewing machines.

Patents are a widespread intellectual property protection institution, but their effects on the spatial and technology spillovers of innovation are ambiguous. Using novel data on patent examiners over 1919-1938 in a difference-in-differences framework, we document that newly appointed examiners grant 14% more patents to inventors near their county of birth. Since examiners oversee one division, changes in patenting in other divisions reflect how patents affect innovation. Patenting in divisions technologically related to the examiner's division increases by 20%. The spatial spillovers of patent protection exhibit substantial geographical concentration. Counties close to the examiners' areas of origin experience significant economic growth.

This paper examines the persistence of political preferences across generations and quantifies its contribution to political segregation. After the election of prominent government officials—such as the President, or state governors—their name becomes politically connoted. The name of an individual born close to an election year thus reflects the political preferences of their parent(s). I leverage this insight to construct and validate a new individual-level measure of intergenerational transmission of political preferences between 1865 and 1940. I find that political preferences are substantially persistent across generations: the son of a Republican (resp. Democrat) is five times more likely to be a Republican (resp. Democrat) than the son of a Democrat (resp. Republican). Individuals are more likely to sort in politically homogenous neighborhoods, thereby increasing political segregation.